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JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: WHY RATIONAL BASIS
ANALYSIS FALLS SHORT
Richard A. Epstein'

INTRODUCTION: JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT AND THE STANDARD OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Let me start this Essay with a large proposition that goes against the
grain of much of modern constitutional law. There is no place for rational
basis review in evaluating any challenge to any govemment tax or regulation. In all cases, the specific guarantees of the Constitution are written in
categorical form, such that the rational basis test inverts the proper assumption behind our whole system of limited govemment under a strong constitution, motivated by a strong presumption of distmst of govemment actors
at all levels. '
This proposition is not quite as broad as it sounds, because it does not
cover those decisions in which the govemment mns or manages programs
on its own. In those cases, the appropriate standard lies much closer to the
business judgment mle that protects the directors and officers of corporations and other voluntary associations from being constantly secondguessed regarding the way they manage the institutions put in their charge.^
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter and Kirsten
Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law and
Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago. My thanks to Samuel Eckman and Taylor A.R. Meehan,
Uhiversity of Chicago Law School, Class of 2013, for their usual excellent research assistance.
' See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICLAL REVIEW 7577 (1980). Note that Ely was selective in his invocation ofthat principle insofar as he gave weight to
Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), which tended to limit
that protection to suspect classes and "discrete and insular minorities." Id. at 152 n.4. The difficulty with
this formulation goes back to Madison's original work on faction, which contained no such limitation,
see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), and was in fact invoked to protect what we now call the
top 1 percent from expropriation, including expropriation through debtor relief statutes, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
One formulation reads as follows: "[I]n making business decisions not involving direct selfinterest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest
belief that their actions are in the corporation's best interest." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (9th ed.
2009). For a concrete instantiation, see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919)
("Courts of equity will not interfere in the management of the directors unless it is clearly made to
appear that they are guilty of fraud or misappropriation of the corporate funds, or refuse to declare a
dividend when the corporation has a surplus of net profits which it can, without detriment to its business, divide among its stockholders, and when a refusal to do so would amount to such an abuse of
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In those cases, therefore, it takes the identification of a serious instance of
self-dealing to oust the protection of that rule. The self-dealing issue arises
whenever public officials are on both sides of a transaction. In my view it
also arises when large numbers of private parties are ostensibly subject to
the same formal requirements, but in which govemment officials are allowed to engage in what I have termed government by waiver, or selective
release of one competitor from a rule that is left to bind another.'
By way of example, I have long defended a business judgment type
approach in conneetion with the affirmative action programs that are run by
state universities." In my view, there are surely clashing ideals with respect
to the composition of various voluntary groups, which is reflected in the
wide difference in attitude toward affirmative action programs in the private
sector. It is therefore the sign of good sense to understand and respect the
faet that these honest differences in opinion should allow a majority to have
its way unless it acts in a fashion that is intended to oppress certain minorities. The eolorblind principle that should apply to the enforeement of the
criminal law, for example, has no strong appeal in this context. I have no
special wisdom on the extent to which diversify is a value that should be
respected by private institutions, but a genuine recognition that the number
of private institutions that hold that diversity is such a value, should temper
any willingness to adopt a per se rule that bans these associational preferences.
Even in this area, however, there is a distinction between the government when it acts in its capacify as a regulator and situations in which it
acts in its capacify as a manager or operator of some public facilify or program. By the same token, therefore, there are few govemment practices that
are more obnoxious than the decision of any govenunent body (or private
accreditation agencies like the American Bar Association, which runs interference for state bar associations) to impose their preferences on private
institutions. The funetion of bar associations is to deal with issues of educational qualify and fitness of graduates to practice law. The very diversity
that justifies the use of a business judgment mle for govemment managers
now requires that a far sfricter scrutiny be imposed on govemment regulators that seek to impose one set of uniform preferences on a wide range of
private institutions that take a rather different view of matters. Religious
institutions, for example, that seek to give preferences to their own members should be respected in their ehoices. Indeed, I see little reason why the

discretion as would constitute a fi-aud, or breach ofthat good faith which they are bound to exercise
towards the stockholders." (quoting Hunter v. Robert, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 131, 134 (1890)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
3 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, NAT'L AFF., Spring 2011, at 39,
ovo;7oè/eo( http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/govemment-by-waiver.
"* See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Rational Basis for Affirmative Action: A Shaky but Classical Liberal Defense, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2036 (2002).
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same rules of freedom of association should not apply to all such arrangements, from the Boy Scouts to the bowling club.^
The intermediate cases all involve the application of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, where the issue is whether the government can
condition the expenditure of public funds on the willingness of private institutions to toe the line on matters that deal with their core beliefs. It is no
accident that the totalitarian inclinations of government were all too evident
in the Supreme Court's unwise decision in Christian Legal Society Chapter
of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez^
where a five-four majority held that Hastings could deny various privileges
to a tiny Christian group that it routinely extended to other groups that fell
under the Hastings Law School umbrella.' It is also evident in connection
with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA"), as the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, has taken it
upon herself to exclude Roman Catholic schools, charities, and hospitals
from the requirement that they supply contraception, abortion, and sterilization services to their own members.* Closer to this discussion of the Commerce Clause, I take sfrong exception to her decision to exclude any institution from sharing the benefits of the PPACA unless it agrees to provide
abortion-related services to persons who are not within their faith communities, even when they regard those behaviors as anathema to their core religious beliefs. Their members, as citizens, contribute to the common fund,
and it is just a form of expropriation to include conditions that exclude them
from participating in these programs on even terms with others. The government could never force Catholic institutions to administer abortions or
sterihzation if it did not have the spending power at its beck and call. It
should never be allowed to acquire wealth first through taxation, which it
then distributes back to its favored clientele.' At one time, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions had a distinctive liberal flavor, as it was used,
rightly in my view, to prevent the state from holding that only those veterans that signed loyalty oaths could receive govemment benefits.'" It is a sad

^ Cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that required inclusion of homosexuals violated the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right to expressive association).
* 130S.Ct. 2971 (2010).
' W. at 2984-95.
See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623-24 (Aug. 3,
2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). For criticism ofthe
rule, see Timothy M. Dolan, ObamaCare and Religious Freedom, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2012, at Al 7.
' For my general statement of these principles, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING
WITH THE STATE (1993).
'" Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 514-15, 529 (1958) (refusing to allow taxing authorities to
condition real estate tax exemptions on signing a loyalty oath). The Speiser Court stated: "[T]he denial
of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech." W. at 519.
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commentary on how quickly we can forget the origins of this rule, so that
today this bulwark against govemment power is quietly jettisoned to allow
a juggernaut with a liberal agenda to go forward.
This regrettable resort to the rational basis test in regulator>' and conditional grant contexts has a deleterious impact on the quality of judieial reasoning. Once the Court decides under a rational basis test that any bad argument will suffice to uphold a statute, the Court lapses into the habit of
making lazy and bad arguments. The pattem of discourse now takes on a
self-inflicted presumption of judicial incompetence, under which overworked and undereducated judges are unable to grasp the essential elements
of any large soeial question. Within this framework, deference becomes
both an institutional and intellectual necessity. The prophecy of judicial
ineptitude is largely self-fulfilling, by opinions that are at war with any
sound constitutional analysis.
The sfriking difference between rational basis analysis and some higher level of scmtiny is encapsulated in one word, "conceivable," that Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor has used for a unanimous court in dealing with the
question of when a govemment action is an impermissible taking for private use. In Hawaiian Housing Authority v. Midkiff," she wrote to uphold a
statutory scheme where the state legislature was prepared (once it received
in escrow the needed funds from the tenant in possession) to condemn the
landlord's interest and fransfer it to the tenant.'^ It looks like a taking not
only from A to B, but from A', A", etc. to B', B " , and the like. But unfazed by the obvious point that the more extensive the program the greater
the constitutional violation, she wrote: "[W]here the exercise of the eminent
domain power is rationally related to a conceivable publie purpose, the
Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public
Use Clause."" No scrutiny on means, and none on ends, can yield only one
result.
The landscape differed in Kelo v. City of New London,"" which involved the taking of private property for urban improvement. Justice
O'Connor, now repentant, dissented from her earlier Kelo decision. But it
was Justice Clarence Thomas who best expressed the skeptical mood when
he wrote that "the Takings Clause authorizes the taking of property only if
the public has a right to employ it, not if the public realizes any conceivable
benefit from the taking.'"^ It is hard to find any principled reason to think
that the govemment action in Kelo was more high-handed and egregious
than the Midkijf one. Everything tumed on the acceptance or rejection of

467 U.S. 229(1984).
Id. at 233-34. (upholding HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 516-522 (1977)).
M a t 241.
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Id. at 510 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the appropriate standard of review that was signaled by the two different
ways in which it was possible to deploy the term "conceivable."
The importance that is attached to standards of review is what ultimately will decide the outcome of the two major constitutional challenges
to Title I and Title II of PPACA. The first of these deals with the individual
mandate, based on the Commerce Clause, by which individuals have to pay
a fine to government if they do not purchase healthcare insurance.'* T'he
second question, dealing with Medicaid, raises the issue of whether the
federal govemment may present states with the following choice: either
agree to take on new business of a large amount, paid for out of your own
resources, or forfeit all federal assistance for existing Medicaid programs as
your own citizens continue to pay taxes for Medicaid services that now will
only benefit the citizens of other states." In dealing with these issues, everything depends on how the standard of review is framed. Use rational basis
consistently and the sheer complexity of the program means that the federal
govemment will prevail, as the Justices can see both sides of every question. Use a standard of intermediate or sfrict scmtiny and all of a sudden
any federalism case becomes a horse race because a critical intelligence is
brought to bear to the argunients on both sides of the dispute.
That is surely tme here. The question under the individual mandate is
whether it lies within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause,
and the question of the Medicaid mandate is whether the use of the spending power results in placing the state in a subservient position. In both cases, the standard of review issue is closely intertwined with the docfrine of
unconstitutional conditions.
In both cases, moreover, the only way for the attacks to have a chance
of success is for the U.S. Supreme Court to jettison its habitual reliance on
the rational basis test for federalism issues. The only way that this ean be
done is to force the Justices to have a more intense level of judicial engagement, by persuading them that the rational basis test is utterly inconsistent with the sfructure of American federalism, which was recognized by
the sound precedents that held sway until the constitutional fransformation
of the New Deal. Part I of this Essay deals, therefore, with this historical
evolution under the Commerce Clause in connection with the individual
mandate. Part II deals with the parallel questions under the spending power.
In this last Part it is clear that Justice O'Connor's consistent and stout defense of sfrong state rights in the federal system—which are in such sfriking
confrast to her porous and unsatisfactory Midkiff opinion—offers the only
path of success. I shall take these up in order.

'^ See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501-1502, 124 Stat.
119,242-52(2010).
'•^ See id §§2001-2002, 124 Stat. at 271-82.
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THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: THE
NEW DEAL TRANSFORMATION

Prior to the oral argument, any handicapping of the odds for the success of overturning the individual mandate had to rate them at less than
50/50. There was no indication that any of the four liberal Justices—
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—are less than rock-solid progoverrunent on the issue. For the mandate to fall, therefore, all five conservative Justices had to be willing to knock out a cog from the largest
piece of social legislation in nearly fifty years, perhaps ever. The conventional wisdom had it that Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito might be willing to do so, but Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy were less likely
to be supporters of this view. The tone ofthe questioning, especially Justice
Kennedy's opening question: "Can you create commerce in order to regulate it?" may well have changed the odds.
Nonetheless, it is clear that Circuit Court decisions may still prove to
be a more accurate harbinger of what is to come. To give but one example,
it is possible to read the recent decision by Judge Laurence Silberman in
Seven-Sky v. Holder,'* io uphold the mandate is a strong straw in the wind.
Judge Silberman is a distinguished conservative jurist, whose views could
easily be read to presage the votes of any of the five conservative Justices.
His opinion thus represents a defection from the conservative to the liberal
position on this issue, which makes the challengers' uphill battle even
steeper.
The best way to shore up the shaky five, therefore, is to get them to rethink the underpinnings of the Commerce Clause, and to wean them from
the rational basis principle that crept into the area during the New Deal
fransformation of federal law. That fransformation is evident in many ofthe
Commerce Clause formulations, especially in connection with the so-called
aggregation principle, which holds that small instances of given behavior
must be viewed together to see if they have an indirect effect on interstate
conduct, thereby affording the Congress a rational basis on which to act.
The principle clearly has a lot to say about the need to herd everyone into
the individual mandate. It seems ready made for the occasion to quote the
1971 Supreme Court case of Perez v. United States.'^^ dealing with a federal loan sharking statute, the case held that "a class of activities was held
properly regulated by Congress without proof that the particular intrastate
activity against which a sanction was laid had an effect on commerce."^"
Since the individual mandate is general legislation that necessarily impacts
multiple individual instances, the statement of the question leads to only

661 F.3dl (DC. Cir. 2011).
402 U.S. 146(1971).
W. at 152 (emphasis omitted).
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one answer in this and every other case. That reductio ad absurdam motivated Justice Potter Stewart's frustrated protest in Perez. He could not see
how Congress could "rationally" make the conneetion between loan sharking and interstate commerce, unless the entire sphere of criminal activity
could necessarily be regulated at the federal level.^' Put otherwise, Perez
covertly denies that there are any effective limits on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
That result was, of course, exactly the point of the majority decision,
which relied explicitly on all the judicial decisions that ratified the eonsolidation of the New Deal by sweeping away all the constitutional objections
against it.^^ United States v. £>ar6y upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act.^"
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.^^ upheld the power of Congress to
regulate the price of miUc under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937.^* And Wickard v. Filburn^'' upheld the power of Congress to regulate the ability of a farmer to feed his own wheat to his own cows under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.^' In rendering these decisions, the
Supreme Court eonsciously posited a supposed continuify from the Founding Period through the New Deal. Thus, in Perez, the Court announced that
in Darby, Wrightwood and Wickard, "the broader view of the Commeree
Clause announced by Chief Justice Marshall had been restored."^'
The commerce power, he [Chief Justice Stone] said, "extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce."'"

The only problem with this oft-quoted statement is that Chief Justice
Marshall never said it. His sentenee read: "Comprehensive as the word
'among' is, it may very properly be resfricted to that commerce which eoncems more States than one."^' It takes an extraordinary constitutional law to
treat "extend" and "restrieted" as synonyms, when they are in fact oppo-

Id. at 157-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Because I am unable to discern any rational distinction
between loan sharking and other local crime, 1 cannot escape the conclusion that this statute was beyond
the power of Congress to enact. The definition and prosecution of local, intrastate crime are reserved to
the States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.").
See generally id. at 150-57 (majority opinion).
^3 312 U.S. 100(1941).
2'' W. at 125-26.
25 315 U.S. 110(1942).
2* W a t 125-26.
2'' 3I7U.S. I l l (1942).
2^ W. at 130-33.
2' Perezv. UnitedStates, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971).
3" Id. (quoting Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 119).
3' Gibbonsv. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 194(1824).
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sites. No Supreme Court Justice should ever snip a vital sentence at its key
point in order to reserve its meaning. That huge misreading is not made any
more palatable by its constant repetition. ^^ This blatant maneuver is only the
tip of a large iceberg. To get to the root of this fransformation, it is necessary to expose the deep cleavage between the Commerce Clause, as it came
down from the Constitutional Convention in 1787, and the faux Commerce
Clause that emerged out ofthe New Deal.
There is, alas, no mythical restoration of some bygone Eden. Looked
at from the vantage point ofthe original Constitution, the PPACA should be
dead on arrival. But the New Deal fransformation of long-established
Commerce Clause jurisprudence infroduced a set of unprincipled (but finegrained) distinctions that turn the law into a mass of linguistic absurdities,
which should lead ordinary people to doubt the collective sobriety of the
legal profession. The regnant view of the Commerce Clause gives full sway
to the legitimacy of Wickard v. Filburn when it should freat that decision as
a derelict on the law. The issue here is of manifest importance, but it is not
for that reason difficult. Text, sfructure, context, and history demonstrate in
combination that Wickard and the endless efforts to rationalize that decision
should be emphatically rejected as a matter of first principle.
In making out this strong rejectionist claim, I am not insisting, or even
suggesting, that the Supreme Court has to overmle the Wickard line of cases in order to sfrike down the individual mandate in the PPACA. It is quite
clear that so much water has passed over the dam, and so many federal programs are now in place solely because of the Wickard magic, that this result
will never take place. But what it is possible to do is to undermine the legitimacy of Wickard and its progeny, so that it no longer becomes a fit platform from which to expand the current scope of the Commerce Clause to
the point of forcing individuals into activities against their will. That prohibition works in two ways. First, it means that the Commerce Clause should
not be read to allow the Congress to force people to buy insurance or do
daily exercise. No state govemment could have those extensive powers
under their own constitutions. The federal goverrmient should not have that
power either. Second, a systematic application of the unconstitutional conditions docfrine means that the federal govemment cannot say that any person that wants to use the interstate highways, or to watch television, has to
agree to purchase health insurance or succumb to the individual mandates.
These conditions are, at best, unrelated to the activities to which they are
attached. It is widely understood that the Congress could condition access
to public roads on having a driver's license, but not on the willingness to
waive future private tort actions against the federal govemment. Both these
feints should be disallowed. The purpose of the remainder of this Part is to

•'^ For a more detailed defense of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope ofthe
Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1401-08 (1987).
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explain why Wickard has only longevity on its side, because the ease from
principle points inexorably against that decision.
A.

Commerce Versus Manufacture

Start with the text: "Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes."" On its face, this doesn't read like an unlimited dictate that
lets Congress impose national solutions to what it regards as national problems. Commerce is a subset of the nation's economic power, and the natural
reading of that term covers the types of matters that would be included, for
example, in the Uniform Commercial Code, which deals with sales, negotiable interests, secured transactions, and the like. Read in this fashion, the
Clause confirms what James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 45, namely
that powers delegated to the federal government are "few and defined,"
while those left to the states "are numerous and indefinite."'" One reason
why Judge Silberman's opinion in Seven-Sky is so unsatisfactory is that it
wrenches the Clause out of its textual and historical context, putting the
issue like this: "No Supreme Court case has ever held or implied that Congress's Commerce Clause authority is limited to individuals who are presently engaging in an activity involving, or substantially affeeting, interstate
"
commerce.""
To defend this proposition. Judge Silberman looks to the text and
hones in on the word "regulate," which he correctly points out as meaning
"'[t]o adjust by rule or method,' as well as '[t]o direct.""' From this,
though, he wrongly concludes that there is "no textual support" for the challenge to PPACA." The interpretation of the Commerce Clause cannot be
compressed into a single word. The Clause has to be read in its entirety,
which forces two other questions to the fore. First, what is the meaning of
commerce? The implicit subtext of Judge Silberman's analysis is that it
embraces any and all productive activity, whether economic or noneconomic. Indeed, he goes further, insisting that there is nothing in the decided cases that extend the Clause so far as to preclude Congress from taking the
next step, which is to regulate various forms of economic inactivity as well.
Under that expansive view. Congress can now require individuals to take
out insurance, and to do so whether it is to prevent them from freeloading

33

U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

3'* THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
35 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011 ).
3* Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 2 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1667 (1755),
available at http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=1667) (first internal quotation
marks omitted).
37 Id
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on others, to provide emergency facilities, or to exact from them exfra dollars that will allow high-risk people into the system, without imposing a
general tax on income to fund those losses.
In making this exfravagant claim. Judge Silberman at no point cites the
key 1824 decision of Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,^^
which sets the direction of the debate over the proper scope of the Commerce Clause. At issue in Gibbons was whether Gibbons, the operator of
two steamboats from Elizabethtown, New Jersey, to New York, New York,
had to respect the exclusive franchise originally given to Robert Fulton and
Robert Livingstone (and assigned to Ogden) to operate steamboats in New
York State waters."
Chief Justice Marshall held that these voyages were within interstate
commerce, meaning that the federal law tmmped this form of state action."*
In so doing, however, he made clear the limits ofthe federal power. Indeed,
he spent an extensive amount of time belaboring the point that navigation
across state lines was part of interstate commerce,"' which would have been
totally unnecessary if the definition of commerce had the broad definition
given to it in any of the New Deal cases and accepted as gospel in both Perez and Seven-Sky. The opinion stated: "State inspection laws, health laws,
and laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which
respect tumpike roads, ferries, &c. are not within the power granted to
Congress.""^ In dealing with this issue, he envisions a progression of goods
that start hfe as subject to the power of the states; they then move into domestic and foreign commerce; finally, they emerge from commerce where
"[t]hey form a portion ofthat immense mass of legislation, which embraces
everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
government.""^
New York's monopoly, therefore, was not disturbed with respect to
boats that started and ended their joumeys in New York State water. Marshall could not have been clearer in the sentence already quoted: "Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more States than one.""" This proposition is then
followed by the acknowledgement that "the completely interior traffic of a
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
39 W. at 1-2.
"*" Id. at 189-90 ("The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or
the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a
general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic,
but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and
parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.").
'•I W. at 194-96.
''2 W. at203annot.
"•^ W. at 203.
'^ Gibbons, 21 \i.S. at \94.
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State" is outside the scope of the Clause,"' from which it follows that manufacturing, mining, and agriculture are outside its scope as well.
In fracing the future misuse of Gibbons, it is important to give special
attention to Marshall's use of the term "resfricted." There was no hint whatsoever in Gibbons that the federal government could regulate manufacture
or other services provided on a local basis. Indeed, any decision to the contrary would have provoked a constitutional uproar because it would have
allowed Congress to abolish slavery within the Southem States, which was
inconceivable at the time.
Not one echo of Marshall's careful limitations is heard in the modern
cases. Judge Silberman's statement of fundamental prineiples ignores them
totally. Instead, Silberman presupposes that the limits to Congress's Commerce Clause power revolve around the question of whether it is only limited to individuals who are "engaging in an activity involving, or substantially affecting, interstate commerce.""* The word "activity" does not appear
in the constitutional text, and is manifestly broader in meaning than the
term "commerce." The phrase "substantially affecting" interstate commerce
is equally foreign to Chief Justice Marshall's reading of the commerce
power, for it clearly implies that important local activities somehow become national activities if they are of sufficient frequency or magnitude,
which is a conscious reversal of Marshall's meaning.
At one point, Marshall does note that Congress has a "plenary" power."' But read in context, that evocative term does not mean that Congress
can regulate everything under the sun. Indeed the full sentence speaks of
this plenary power "though limited to specified objects" cannot be undone
by the states."* Plenary means dominant within a limited sphere, not dominant in a broad sphere. Read in context, the word only means that once an
activity falls within the restricted definition of "commerce among the several states," the states must yield to the national government on matters
within that area. Judge Silberman lets the cat out of the bag when he notes
that "[t]he Framers, in using the term 'commerce among the states,' obviously intended to make a distinction between interstate and local commerce, but Supreme Court jurisprudence over the last century has largely
eroded that distinction.""' This desfroys the myth of a seamless history in a
world tumed upside down by judicial sleight of hand. It is now necessary to
explain how the expansion took place.
One conspicuous stop on this joumey is the 1895 decision of United
States V. E.C Knight Co.,^" which rightly read Gibbons to hold that manu"5
'^
"'
"8
"^
5"

Id.
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
G/¿¿on.s, 22 U.S. at 197.
Id
Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 16.
156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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facture preceded commerce and was not part of it. It was well understood
that these activities were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.
E.C. Knight thus makes reference to the 1888 decision in Kiddv. Pearson,^^
which addressed the other side of the coin: only states could regulate the
manufacture of intoxicating liquors—an issue that fits into this story later—
from which the federal govemment was blocked:
If it be held that the term [commerce] includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are
intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny
that it would also include all productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested, to the exclusion ofthe States, with the power
to regulate, not only manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic
fisheries, mining—in short, every branch of human industry.*^

Elsewhere in Kidd, the Court makes it clear that an indirect effect on
the volume of interstate commerce, which could result from forbidding
either manufacturer or retail sales, is not enough to bring the case within the
power ofthe federal government for the same reason as described above.
Can it be said that a refusal of a State to allow articles to be manufactured within her borders
(for export) any more directly or materially affects her external commerce than does her action in forbidding the retail within her borders of the same articles after they have left the
hands ofthe importers? That the latter could be done was decided years ago; and we think
there is no practical difference in principle between the two cases.
"As has been often said, 'legislation [by a State] may in a great variety of ways affect
commerce and persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning ofthe Constitution,'" unless, under the guise of police regulations, it "imposes a direct
burden upon interstate commerce," or "interferes directly with its freedom.""

In this context, the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" is not
some mystical or indeterminate conception beyond the ability of a court to
apply or a Congress to respect. "Direct" is the regulation of the shipment of
goods in interstate commerce. "Indirect" is the regulation of those activities
that take place either prior to or after that shipment. Wickard does not distinguish between the two cases, but the prior law did in unmistakable terms,
and for one reason: the old view rests on the integrity of two related lines.
The first was between production and fransportation.^ The second was be-

^' 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
52 W. at2I.
5^ Id. at 23 (alteration in original) (quoting Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485,487,488 (1878)).
5'' See, e.g.. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) ("When [goods are] offered for
shipment, and before transportation begins, the labor of their production is over, and the mere fact that
they were intended for interstate commerce transportation does not make their production subject to
federal control under the commerce power."), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
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tween transportation and use or consumption." Collapse these two distinctions and the limited nature of the commerce power is gone.
The logic of the time could not be clearer. Manufacture preceded
commerce, so that each activity was subject to one and only one sovereign.
What was striking about the decision in E.C. Knight was that it built on
both Gibbons and Kidd to forge a vision of federalism that was faithful to
the original plan. Within that scheme, what was notable about E.C. Knight
was that it treated the enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act against
nationwide cartels as though it were a local matter—a decision that did not
last long at all in light ofthe Court's subsequent decision in Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. V. United States.^^ The takeaway from the entire line of cases is
that before the New Deal no one ever understood that local manufacturing,
agriculture, mining, or the provision of any kind of service from retail to
health care was not subject to the exclusive regulation of the states. The
only dent during this period on the hard line of local regulation occurred in
the Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States (Shreveport
Rate Cases) ^'' in which then Justice Hughes held that Congress could regulate intrastate railroads that were in direct competition with interstate lines:
[These cases] illustrate the principle that Congress in the exercise of its paramount power
may prevent the common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse
from being used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce. This is not
to say that Congress possesses the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a State, as
such, but that it does possess the power to foster and protect interstate commerce, and to take
all measures necessary or appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate
carriers may thereby be controlled.'*

Note these limitations. The Hughes opinion refers to "the common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse,"^' which
does not include manufacturing, and in line with Gibbons there remains
much internal commerce that lies outside the scope of the federal government. The case represents a slight erosion of earlier principles, and an indefensible one.*"

'^ See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
^^ 175U.S. 211 (1899).
" 234 U.S. 342(1914).
^^ W a t 3 5 3 .
« Id
^ For a longer critique, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE
CONSTITUTION 53-58 (2006).
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Direct Regulation of Commerce

Thus far it is clear that the earlier cases did not impose any limitation
on the way in which Congress could regulate the shipment of goods in interstate commerce. But during the late nineteenth century, the pressure built
for more eomprehensive regulation. On the conservative side, the demand
for national regulation by Congress of alcohol and gambling helped propel
the movement forward. On the progressive side, the desire to regulate food,
drugs, and child labor added additional impetus to the search to find ingenious ways to circumvent the uniform limitations found running from Gibbons to E.C. Knight. Those pressures reached the Supreme Court in the
pivotal 1903 Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames)," which held—only by a
five-to-four vote—that the federal govemment eould prohibit the shipment
of lottery tickets in interstate eommeree, even when their production and
use was legal in the states at both ends of the journey.'^ In effect, federal
officials used their monopoly power over interstate commerce to leverage
their control over local activities. Champion is clearly distinguishable from
E.C Knight. Nonetheless, stmcturally it is clearly wrong because, left unchecked, it spells the end of federalism. All firms have to ship goods in
interstate trade to survive, and the Congressional chokehold on interstate
eommeree would have allowed Congress to put the following hard choice
to all merchants: either bend to the federal will on matters of local production or abandon the national market. One can only imagine what the reaction would have been if, in 1840, Congress had attempted to pass a statute
that forbade the shipment of cotton from slave plantations into either the
national or the foreign market. The problem with Champion is that it represents the classic type of monopoly extension argument. The United States
has no competitor when it regulates the shipment of goods in interstate
commerce. It can therefore use that power to exfract any concession from
loeal firms so long as it is less expensive than the loss of its access to markets outside the state. The leverage thus forces virtually every major firm to
forsake the national market, which clearly they cannot afford to do.
Champion represents a new and striking departure from the Court's
earlier Commeree Clause jurisprudence. But far from being some isolated
rogue decision. Champion created the decisive opening for President Theodore Roosevelt's Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906" to put some teeth into
drug regulation without running afoul of the clear limitations of E.C.
Knight. The 1906 Act made it "unlawful for any person to manufacture
within any Territory or the Disfrict of Columbia any article of food or drug
^' 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
^2 Jd at 363-64.
^3 Pure Food and Dmg Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1 15 (1934)), repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 902(a),
52 Stat. 1040, 1059.
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which is adulterated or misbranded."** It outlawed the "infroduction" or
"shipment" of misbranded foods and drugs into the states—but, conspicuously, it did not regulate the manufacture of drugs within the states.*' The
reason was clear enough. Everyone realized what eluded the New Deal Justices: Champion did not overrule E.C. Knight.
The expansionist agenda of Congress to use direct regulation to gain
confrol over the intemal operations of the state came to a temporary halt,
moreover, in the 1918 case Hammer v. Dagenhart.^ There the Court refused to extend Champion beyond those classes of goods that were subject
to regulation, at least at the state level, under the morals head of the police
power.*' Hammer barred Congress from prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made in factories that did not conform to the federal minimum age standard for child labor.** Once again, it was clear that
Congress could not leverage its power over interstate commerce to confrol
activities that were reserved to the states under the original constitutional
scheme. Since, moreover, direct regulation was off limits to the federal
govemment, so too was taxation, its close regulatory substitute. In 1922, the
Child Labor Tax Case^^ held that Congress could not seek to pressure the
states by taxing all goods made with child labor that were shipped in interstate commerce.™ To this point at least, basic constitutional structure held
firm. The key point was that taxation is known to be an effective, if only
partial, substitute for direct prohibition. Indeed, if the tax is set consciously
above the potential gains from all fransactions of a given class, its effects
are indistinguishable from a regulation. All economic activity of the given
kind will cease, and the revenues raised will be zero—the exact outcome
from a direct prohibition.
The hold of E.C. Knight on the basic understanding of the Commerce
Clause is also evident in the text of the Eighteenth and Twenty-First
Amendments." The fu-st of these established prohibition in 1920. The second repealed it in 1933. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale, or fransportation of intoxicating liquor, which covered the full
gamut of activities at the federal and state level. But when the Twenty-First
Amendment repealed prohibition, it did not mention manufacture. Instead,
Section 2 reads as follows:

Pure Food and Drug Act § I.
See id § 2.
247 U.S. 251 (1918),oveAr«/erf/n/jor/6j United Statesv.Darby,312 U.S. 100(1941).
W. at 273-74.
W a t 276.
259 U.S. 20(1922).
Id at 39^0.
U.S. CONST, amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST, amend. XXI, § 1.
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The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States
for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.'^

This Amendment does not apply to all activities but only to the transportation or importation of intoxicating liquors, and only with respect to
those states that choose to remain dry. The only way that this provision is
intelligible is against the backdrop that the federal government could not by
legislation either prohibit or authorize the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor, both of which remained exclusively local options. That was of
course the combined result of decisions like Kidd, which established local
control over the manufacture of intoxicating spirits, and E.C. Knight, which
blocked the federal government from regulating these goods.'' Hence the
Amendment makes it clear that the federal govemment cannot make a state
dry. But once any state exercised the option to stay dry. Congress was dutybound to prohibit fransportation or importation. In one sense this rule is old
because it recognizes that Congress had power only over transportation. But
in a second respect it was sfriking because it appears to compel the federal
govemment to engage in that form of regulation over commerce, where that
term is used in the same sense that it was used in Gibbons.
This older synthesis held firm until as late 1935, when the Supreme
Court in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States^'* stmck down key
provisions of key federal codes of fair competition on the ground that sick
chickens were no longer in interstate commerce once they were off-loaded
from interstate raiboads onto local trucks.'^ The opinion in Schechter is not
labored or forced. It shows further that the older mle that uses hard boundary lines to demarcate the division of federal and state power did not become
obsolete with time. Quite the opposite, matters of jurisdiction are, like determinations of liability, on/off switches. Either you have it or you do not.
These binominal outcomes map well into sfrong and sharp lines that establish the respective spheres of influence of the national and state governments.
Understand what is at stake. That sharp edge is not some form of silly
formalism of unsophisticated minds. Rather, it is recognition that dichotomous decisions require simple yes/no stmctures. The large reduction of
joint sovereignty over most local activities had the additional advantage of
removing the risk of dual, and possibly inconsistent, enforcement of primary activities of ordinary individuals and firms. The eentral tmth is that no
change in the overall conditions of markets rendered the constitutional

'2
'3
(1895).
'''
'5

Id amend. XXI, § 2.
Kiddv. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1888); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14-17
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Id at 543.
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sfructure of 1789 inappropriate for the new set of circumstances. The principles that applied to interstate steamships applied as well to automobiles,
raikoads, airplanes, telephones, and telegraphs. Indeed, the stability of the
overall structure was an added advance to the new system.
Nonetheless, two years after Schechter the dam broke. The key case
was National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.''^Decided in 1937, a closely divided Supreme Court magically expanded the
scope of the commerce power to allow the National Labor Relations Act to
regulate unionization in manufacturing plants." Darby, Wrightwood Dairy,
and Wickard followed in rapid succession so that by 1942, the new constitutional sfructure had fransformed itself into some long-established fruth.
For decades the received wisdom was that under Wickard, the Commerce
Clause gave Congress a carte blanche. That consensus was rudely shattered
in 1995 in United States v. Lopez,''^ where Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a narrow five-to-four majority, sfruck down the Gun-Free School Zones
Act that forbade carrying a gun within 1,000 feet of a school.™
In one sense, the opinion was a sea change insofar as it indicated that
there was at least some outer limit on the scope of federal power. But at
root, the opinions in Lopez do nothing to unpack the deep contradictions in
Commerce Clause interpretation. Chief Justice Rehnquist uneasily embraced both James Madison and Wickard simultaneously in his highly infiuential account ofthe three sfrands ofthe commerce power.'" Thus, after a
quick review of all the familiar precedents from Gibbons through Perez, he
writes as though these cases have identified a single harmonious vision of
the commerce power, without pausing to discuss the evolution of the docfrine:
Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce [Darby]. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come onlyfi-omintrastate activities [Shreveport]. Finally,
Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce [Jones & Laughlin]."

At no point is there the slightest explicit acknowledgment that the first
category refers the territory covered by Gibbons but subject to an important
caveat about the tension between Champion and Hammer. The second category covers only a limited exception that does not reach those cases of
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
W a t 43.
514 U.S. 549(1995).
W. at 551-52, 567-68.
See/rf. at 552-59.
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
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intemal commerce. The third category does all the work, by extending the
scope of power far beyond the fraditional categories, so much so that the
greatest revolution in constitutional history is captured, as it were, in code
by the shift from "indirect effects" on interstate commerce to "substantial
relation" to interstate commerce.*^ The choice of semantics thus concealed
the enormous gap between the three categories.
The shaky R.ehnquist opinion in Lopez was butfressed by an opinion of
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who relied on a dubious form of linguistic skepticism, insisting that "semantic or formalistic categories" can't define commerce.*^ But his philosophical point gets it exactly backwards for the reasons set out above. Jurisdictional questions require the same clear boundaries that are found between landowners, on public roads, or on athletic
fields. Any hard line demarcations will always outperform the kind of balancing tests that appeal to Justice Kennedy, by lowering simultaneously
both decision costs and error costs. To refreat from a sensible solution to an
amorphous one is not the path to constitutional clarity.
In dealing with PPACA, also known as ObamaCare, it is no accident
that in Seven-Sky, Judge Silberman dutifully treated Wickard as the lodestar
against which ObamaCare should be decided—only to note the case gives
no particular guidance on the question of whether individual inaction can be
regulated under the commerce power.*" He rightly concedes that no act of
Congress has ever attempted to regulate this form of pure inaction.*' He
then quickly notes that, by the same token, no judicial decision has said that
these forms of inaction could not be regulated.** As a lower court judge, he
is entitled to kick the can upstairs, because his is the unhappy task of making sense of an elaborate line of Supreme Court cases that have never really
grappled with the issue.
Now that it has reached the Supreme Court, ObamaCare still faces an
uncertain fate. With the exception of Justice Clarence Thomas, the current
Supreme Court is, after Lopez, dead-set against overturning Wickard. But
the Justices do not have to overturn Wickard to sfrike down the individual
mandate. What they must do is acknowledge what Judge Silberman has
denied—Wickard's indefensible pedigree—and then refuse to budge one
inch further. With Wickard's overreaching discredited, it is far easier to
accept the sensible claim that commerce does not apply to transactions that
people never entered into. Quite simply, the action/inaction distinction
would be beside the point if the New Deal Court had not gone off the deep

^^

Cf 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 831-32 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing

the significance of Lopez).
^^ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
^^ Seven-Sky V. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
^^ Id. at 17 ("[Prior] cases did not raise the question—presented here—of whether "inactivity" can
also be regulated.").
^^ W. at 17-18.

2012]

JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

949

end in the first place. Manifestly, if Gibbons were still law, the PPACA
wouldn't stand a snowball in hell's chance of surviving. But if the Justices
recognize publicly that Wickard is an inexcusable constitutional aberration,
then knocking out the individual mandate should be a piece of cake, for the
one point that is absolutely incorrect in Judge Silberman's opinion is that
national problems require national solutions." Not so. The situation on the
ground is, often, quite the opposite. The National Labor Relations Act, for
instance, did not solve any national problem when it introduced a regime of
mandatory collective bargaining into all employment relations throughout
the United States. Nor did the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, sustained in Wickard, solve any national problem when it authorized the Department of Agriculture to initiate a system of nationwide cartels for the
allocation of various crops. To be sure, it solved the problem of how labor
and agricultural interests eould monopolize large segments of the economy.
But such "solutions" come at the cost of the welfare of the public at large.
And such will be the case with PPACA, should it be sustained on this point.
Today's economic situation is indeed grim and is likely to remain so
for some time. The last thing that this nation needs is a national solution to
a problem that is better solved in a piecemeal way by the states, whose abilify to dole out goodies is limited by the competition that they face from
other states. All it takes for the Supreme Court to reach that position is to
engage seriously with the precedents and not rely on a potted version of the
rational basis test to allow it to skip past deep problems with the current
law. The U.S. Supreme Court should confess error and acknowledge that its
past decisions are bad both as a matter of constitutional history and constitutional theory. It should not compound past errors by extending an imperial version of the commerce power into new areas where it has yet to go, and
which, as Judge Silberman acknowledges, are eoneeptually distinguishable
from every legislative initiative that the federal government has undertaken
to date. National problems require not authoritarian national solutions; rather, they require a healthy dose of interstate competition that has for too
long been suppressed.
n.

THE MEDICAID MANDATE

At first blush, the issues involved in connection with the Medieaid
mandate seem to have little to do with the set of interpretive issues raised in
connection with the individual mandate.** The Medicaid mandate requires
But see id. at 20 ("The right to be free from federal regulation is not absolute, and yields to the
imperative that Congress be free to forge national solutions to national problems, no matter how local—or seemingly passive—their individual origins." (emphasis added)).
For a vivid description of the consequence, see I. Glenn Cohen & James F. Blumstein, The
Constitutionality of the ACA 's Medicaid-Expansion Mandate, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103 (2012).
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the state to undertake providing Medicaid insurance for individuals between
100 percent and 133 percent of the poverty level.*' In addition, the PPACA
sets a new "minimum essential coverage" level—equal to that needed to
satisfy the requirements of the individual mandate for all covered persons
that states must supply to all Medicaid recipients.'" Last, the PPACA requires that the states take on the responsibility for providing "the care and
services themselves, or both"; if they refuse to comply with these provisions, they lose their federal matching funding for current Medicaid expenses." But in this instance, appearances are misleading. What drives the
question of whether the mandate will be valid is the connection between the
rational basis test and the docfrine of unconstitutional conditions. In this
instance, the issue arises in connection with the spending power found in
Article I:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but
all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States .. . P

The first point to note about this Clause is that the limitation to "the
common Defence and the general Welfare of the United States" should not
be read as if there were no limits on the objects of govemment expenditures. The key point is that "common Defence" is a classical public good
that could only be provided to some individuals if it is provided for all.
Therefore, only taxation can fund the expenditures, even if there are, as is
always the case, deep differences as to what counts as a wise military policy. The "general Welfare of the United States" is cut out of the same cloth
so that only those expenditures that have the character of public goods are
covered by the Clause. The notion that a series of direct payments that go to
some individuals from taxes collected by others is not a credible account of
a public good, which at a minimum excludes the prospect of redisfribution
by seeking to raise (generally) the wealth of all individuals together.'' "It
was 'generally agreed,' noted New York Democratic Senator Robert Wagner, that the General Welfare Clause was 'a resfriction upon the power to
tax rather than an independent grant of legislative authority.'"'"
^^ Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a)(5), 124 Stat. 119,
274 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. IV 2010)).
^ Id § 200l(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 271 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(l)); id § 1501(b), 124 Stat.
at 244 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
^' See id § 2304, 124 Stat. at 296 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)).
'2 U.S. CONST art I, §8, cl. 1.
For further discussion, see generally John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General
Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2001).
Brief of Amici Curiae Cerrter for Constitutional Jurisprudence et. al. in Suppori of Petitioners,
Florida V. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 135051 (quoting 79 CONG.
REC. 9286 (1935)). The cited brief contains numerous other references to the same effect.
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Senator Wagner's view is consistent with the general view that the
Constitution contains limited and enumerated powers, and this position was
largely upheld in United States v. Butler^^ which involved yet another
meddlesome agricultural subsidy project justified on the ground that
due to disparity between the prices of agricultural and other commodities, with consequent
destruction of farmers' purchasing power and breakdown in orderly exchange, which, in
tum, have affected transactions in agricultural commodities with a national public interest
and burdened and obstructed the normal currents of commerce, calling for the enactment of
legislation."

As usual, the explanations offered are economic nonsense, which is designed to conceal the fact that farmers wanted the federal government to set
minimum price for agricultural goods to help fortify their economic position. The usual referenee "to purchasing power" is another way of saying
that farmers should be insulated from the effects of general competition,
even though the higher prices to them imply higher costs to individuals who
in hard times find it difficult to put food on the table. The statute of course
does nothing to facihtate "orderly exchange," which is best aehieved by
allowing goods to achieve their normal price. How market prices have
"burdened and obstructed" normal commerce is never explained. How cartel prices facilitate markets was left equally unexplained.
The best way to throw a bone in the direction of farmers is to have direct resfrictions on the levels of output of the sort that were eventually sustained in Wickard. But in 1935, the Commerce Clause had yet to be extended so that the Congress resorted to a tax and spend scheme similar to that at
work in the Child Labor Tax Case. Thus under the statute: "The processing
tax shall be levied, assessed, and collected upon the first domestic processing of the commodity . . . . at such rate as equals the difference between
the current average farm price for the eommodity and the fair exchange
value."" The proceeds of these taxes were paid to those farmers that agreed
to reduce their acreage in production.'* The combination of the tax and the
expenditure were intended to have the same effect as a direct order on
farmers to limit their production This would have been outside congressional power under E.C. Knight, which was still in effect. Justice Owen
Roberts understood the risks that were posed and sfruck down the plan.''
If, in lieu of compulsory regulation of subjects within the states' reserved jurisdiction, which
is prohibited, the Congress could invoke the taxing and spending power as a means to ac-

297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Id. at 53 (citing Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 601 (1934)).
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 609(a)-(b).
W. §612(a).
SH/Zer, 297 U.S. at 78.
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complish the same end, clause 1 of § 8 of Article 1 would become the instrument for total
subversion ofthe governmental powers reserved to the individual states. '°°

In effect, the purpose of the decision was to make sure that there
would be no end-run around the Commerce Clause. The narrow application
of Butler fell into desuetude after Wrightwood and Wickard because once
direct regulation is proper, the risk of circumvention of constitutional limitations is now at an end. Nonetheless, the issue resurfaced again in South
Dakota v. Dole"" in connection with the exphcit limitation that the TwentyFirst Amendment imposed on the ability of Congress to regulate the manufacture, sale, or consumption of intoxicating liquors within the state. To
dodge this limitation. Congress passed a rule providing that any state that
did not pass a law limiting the general drinking age to twenty-one would be
required to surrender 5 percent ofthe revenues it received from the national
highway program. '"^ The revenue loss in most instances exceeds the harm
to the state from hewing to a lower drinking age. Left with this choice,
states will abjectly surrender.
In dealing with this issue, we face the same question of judicial engagement that is raised in the Commerce Clause line of cases. When taking
a serious view of the stmctural limitations, the amount of the tax does not
matter here any more than it did in the Child Labor Tax Case. The effort to
use conditional spending as a way to expand federal power for an issue that
the Twenty-First Amendment removed from the national government is
inconsistent with the structural design of the Constitution. Justice Brennan
took just that view in an opinion that was short and to the point.'" Writing
for the majority, however. Chief Justice Rehnquist was more clever than
wise when he sought to draw a distinction between "encouragement" and
"coercion," such that the former was allowed and the latter was not. ""
His distinction does not hold water because all the revenues that the
govemment wished to withhold did not come from banana frees, but from
taxes collected from citizens of each state. The decision to first take and
then retum only if conditions are satisfied is no less coercive than the decision of an aduh to take money from an eighteen-year-old individual that he
will retum only if the former agrees to give up drinking until he turns twenty-one. In the private case it does not matter whether the amount that the
adult takes is all that the eighteen-year-old has or only 5 percent of his
wealth. Put bluntly, the fme-spun distinction between encouragement and
coercion cannot work by looking solely at the amount of money subject to
the threat. There is no way to draw a hard line on questions that are matters
100 Id. at 75.

483 U.S. 203(1987).
W. at 205-06,211.
See id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
W. at 211 -12 (majority opinion).
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of degree. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, armed with the
rational basis test, not a single lower court has ever sfruck down a conditional grant as coercive, even when the statute takes as much as 95 percent
of the revenues.'"^ As with any effort to set the line between local and interstate commerce, fuzzy tests of degree do not map into the on/off switches
that are needed to make the inquiry work.
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dole marched off in
the wrong direction with its strong embrace of the rational basis test. Starting from the assumption that the Twenty-First Amendment prohibited Congress from setting the drinking age directly, he nonetheless concluded that it
could do so indirectly through the Spending Clause.'"* His view in this instance was that Congress imposes all sorts of conditions on its expenditures,
and then leaps quickly to the conclusion that "[i]n considering whether a
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts
should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.'"*"
The evident motivation for this position was the awareness that huge
numbers of government grants are subject to conditions. Any constitutional
prohibition against conditional grants, therefore, would have the effect of
shutting down the United States government because it could no longer be
permissible to insist that the recipient of govemment revenues deliver military aircraft or consulting services. The only question is whether there is
some subclass of conditions that pose a threat to the overall constitutional
order, which will of necessity arise only in a small fraction of cases. On this
score, for example. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited to Fullilove v.
Klutznick,'"^ which sustained a program whereby a government grantee had
to agree to devote 10 percent of grant money to minority business enterprises, so long as other certain conditions could be satisfied."^ But that case
presents none of the structural issues involved in either Butler or Dole. The
key antecedent issue is whether the Equal Protection Clause allows for the
govemment to take race into account in its legislative pronouncements. If it
does (and it actually does) then there is no question that the Congress can
take these considerations into account, but only to the same extent, in dealing with its own expenditure program. There is, quite simply, no concern
with the kinds of issues that we have in this case.
It is of course, equally clear that the sfructural elements in Butler were
paramount in the eyes of Justice Roberts."" To cite the case for the (wrong)
proposition that the general welfare should be broadly construed does not
'°^
States,
'°^
'°''
'°^
'°^
"°

See, e.g., Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989); see also California v. United
104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997).
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209-11.
W. at 207.
448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion).
W. at 453,488-92.
SeeButlerv. United States, 297 U.S. 1,62-63(1935).

954

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 19:4

negate the brute fact that, even under that standard. Justice Roberts stmck
down the offending provisions ofthe Agricultural Adjustment Act.'" Chief
Justice Rehnquist thus knew that he could not adopt a rule that made all
conditions per se constitutional, which led to his feeble attempt to allow the
percent of the grant subject to condition to mark the line between coercion
and encouragement.
Unfortunately, none of the mushy factors to which he tumed was remotely equal to this task. The clear statement requirement—"if Congress
desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously . . . enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation'""^—does not reach
the dignity of federal constitutional standard. It hardly answers, a challenge
to congressional overreach for Congress to have made its illegal intention
known clearly. And it hardly matters if the recipient receives notice, when
the most it could do is mitigate the harm from illegal govemment action,
but never undo its effects entirely. Even with years of advance notice. South
Dakota could do nothing to recover the 5 percent of the road grant that it
lost. Nor is it, as Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested, of any particular consequence that the condition imposed be "related to" the grant in question.
Under the rational basis test there is enough connection between the drinking of alcohol by minors and road fatalities. But the question in issue is not
that factual question, but instead whether the federal govemment has any
role to play in making these determinations.
To her great credit. Justice O'Connor did not fall for these fiimsy rationales. Instead she understood that the sfructural issues in question required the Court to face the same question that it rightly answered in Hammer V. Dagenhart. Hammer may have been (wrongly, as noted above) overruled by the New Deal Commerce Clause cases, but in dealing with this
issue Justice O'Connor, who has long been concemed with the boundaries
of federalism, wrote a dissent in Dole that relied on the unconstitutional
conditions logic that underlay the Court's decision in Hammer. "While Butler's authority is questionable insofar as it assumes that Congress has no
regulatory power over farm production, its discussion ofthe spending power and its description of both the power's breadth and its limitations remain
sound.""^ Earlier in the opinion, she noted:
' ' ' See id. at 68 ("We are not now required to ascertain the scope ofthe phrase 'general welfare of
the United States' or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within it. Wholly
apart from that question, another principle embedded in our Constitution prohibits the enforcement of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The act invades the reserved rights ofthe states. It is a statutory plan to
regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government. The tax, the appropriation ofthe funds raised, and the direction for their disbursement, are but
parts ofthe plan. They are but means to an unconstitutional end.").
" ^ Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (alterations in original) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman,45l U.S. 1, 17(1981)).
"^ Id. at216-17(O'Connor,J., dissenting).
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When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is entitled to insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled to insist as a condition of the use of highway funds
that the State impose or change regulations in other areas of the State's social and economic
life because of an attenuated or tangential relationship to highway use or safety. Indeed, if
the rule were otherwise, the Congress could effectively regulate almost any area of a State's
social, political, or economic life on the theory that use of the interstate transportation system
is somehow enhanced. ' '"

Such is an approach that distinguishes between different types of condition, which, of course, is exactly what Hammer said. The key point here
is to apply this anticircumvention argument to various kinds of conditions.
To do so, the first question is whether the direct form of regulation would
raise federalism issues. Two subsequent Supreme Court cases show that
this can happen when the federal govemment seeks to impose direct limitations on how the states cover their own business. New York v. United
States"^ held that the federal government could not commandeer state governments by forcing them to take title to nuclear wastes,'" and Printz v.
United States'" held similarly that it could not force state law enforcement
figures to run background checks on gun applicants."^ The clear implication is that the notion of separation of powers means that the federal demands cannot conscript state governments to do their bidding. In a sense,
this push back against federal power has a deeper dye than the resistance to
federal commerce power because only in the New York case did the federal
govemment take over a state agency. With the Commerce Clause, the federal laws "otüy" preempt or trump state laws.
Now the clear gulf between both New York and Printz, on the one side,
and Dole and the Medieaid mandate on the other side, is that the former
involve direct regulation and the latter involve the conditional use of the
spending power. But once rational basis is rejected as the standard of constitutional review, the direct/indirect distinction is sfripped of its weight,
such that where direct regulation is illicit, so too are conditions imposed on
federal spending. That test works quite easily with Dole because of the distinctive role of the Twenty-First Amendment within the federal scheme.
The situation with Medicaid is more complex because, under current
law, there is no direct prohibition against public expenditures for Medicaid
at the federal level. At that point it is a bit more difficult to tease out the
proper from the improper use of conditions. Obviously any situation in
which the federal govemment tells states that they must use Medicaid expenditures for Medicaid purposes is obviously correct. The parallel is that
the federal money disfributed through the highway system could impose

W. at 215.
505 U.S. 144(1992).
W. at 149, 188.
521 U.S. 898(1997).
W. at 902, 935.
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restrictions on drunk driving or the use of alcohol on public roads because
those activities were within its power prior to the infroduction of prohibition.
Yet the Medieaid mandate, without question, goes mueh further. The
first point here is that at stage one of the process the federal government
collects substantial amounts from the eitizens of each state, which it funnels
back to them through the Medicaid program. Thus one recent study noted
that Califomia had $25 billion of funds at risk and Arizona had $6.3 billion
at risk.'" The preeise numbers are not critical but the style of argument is.
Under the PPACA the state that does not accept coverage for additional
people has to either forfeit these dollars and cover the individuals on Medicaid using their own money, or not cover them. Indeed, in this case it is not
clear that they should not be covered beeause of the burden that each bears
to acquire insurance under the individual mandate. It is, therefore, in the
interest of every state to expend any figure that is less than the amount of
the taxes lost in order to keep those tax revenues. Yet to do so they must
engage in massive tax increases on the one hand and the cutting of other
expenditure programs relating to education, law enforcement, and the like
on the other.
There is, of course, no explicit order to make these cuts. But the new
burden that is placed on this program, years after its introduction, eliminates all possibilities mitigating steps that can do anything effective to soften the blow. In these cases, therefore, the necessary and known consequence of the federal Medicaid mandate is to commandeer huge chunks of
state resources and to require, often explieitly, state officials to run the federal program. The exact level of these costs is of course unknown at present
because the regulations are incomplete, and upon completion are likely to
change again. But that uncertainfy only increases the net burden, while doing nothing to resolve the question that can be resolved right now on the
strength of the available record. It takes, therefore, a supreme level of indifference to how these mies play out in practice to say that these burdens do
not rise to the level of coercion when, unlike the previous programs, they
result in massive dislocation of established state practices. The states are
damned if they take the money, and they are damned if they do not. There
is no "encouragement" in this case, only relentless coercion that should be
struck down because of the many ways in which the use of the conditional
spending power fundamentally alters the structure of state and federal relations for the worse. '^°
" ^ Edmund F. Haislmaier, Quantifying Costs to States of Noncompliance with PPACA's Medicaid
Expansion, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., D.C.), Jan. 12, 2012, at 3 tbl.l.
'
For an argument that the midstream correction should be judged by the normal rules for contract modification, which are resistant to unilateral changes because of risk of predatory or opportunistic
behavior, see Brief of James F. Blumstein, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Florida v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (No. 11 -400), available at http://www.healthreformgps.org/wp-
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CONCLUSION

The current level of ambition found in the PPACA is not only a consequence of the constellation of political forces during the 2009-2010 period;
it is also a consequence of the background of Supreme Court docfrine as it
applies to both the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause, the first of
which is implicated in the individual mandate, and the second in the Medicaid mandate. Notwithstanding the different location of these two constitutional challenges, their underlying sfructure is remarkably similar. In both
cases, what has emboldened Congress to act as it has is the confidence of its
dominant faction that the rational basis test will let it glide past all difficulties, which indeed it does.
The only viable counterattack is to frace the history of both Clauses in
order to establish the proposition that no serious engagement with the constitutional text can work with an uncritical acceptance of that test. The constitutional history that discredits the rational basis test is neither ambiguous
nor obscure. It teaches that the rational basis test is a modern addition to
constitutional law created by Justices who were so determined to expand
the scope of federal power that they dismantled all the major constitutional
limitations on federal power. If this earlier history were arguable and confroversial, the case for reverting to earlier positions would be weak. But in
this instance, there is no real ambiguity on how either of these Clauses was
consfrued. Nor is there much to be said for the political stability of the current system that has conferred far too much power on the federal government, which in tum leads to the excessive influence of whatever faction is
able to pull the sfrings of power in its favor. There are sufficient reliance
interests so that many programs, Medicaid included, cannot be undone. But
there remains no reason to expand these programs in new and mischievous
ways. The earher rules imposed discipline and order on the federal government that have allowed this nation to nourish. The current rules will usher
in an era of empty promises, false expectations, and ruinous financial commitments. A constitution that is built to stand for the ages cannot long survive if its key sfructural limitations are honored in words but violated in
deed. The age for judicial excuses should be over. The Court should recover
its lost heritage by sfriking down the individual mandate and the Medicaid
extension, which pose a deadly threat to the theory and practice of limited
govemment.

content/uploads/Blumstein-amicus-l 1 ^001 .pdf See also Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and
the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (1981) (arguing that in many contract cases, judges
"have acted to deter opportunism and hence decrease its costs," and describing opportunism as "[a]
major problem [that] occurs when a performing party behaves contrary to the other party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer
of wealth fi-om the other party to the performer").
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